Showing posts with label Israel. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Israel. Show all posts
15 October 2007
US Calls for Establishment of Palestinian State
"Frankly, it's time for the establishment of a Palestinian state," Rice said.
This comes from a news story at CTV.ca. I must say that I'm very surprised to hear her saying this only a matter of hours after trying to get all parties scheduled to attend the Middle East peace talks held in the US this week to go in with somewhat low expectations. I guess we can safely that they've been raised extraordinarily high now.
I am in favour of the two-state solution. I would love to see the day that it takes place. I don't know what parameters Rice intends to put forward regarding the continguousness of such a state, its borders, its security situation, or any of the other hindrances to achieving this objective, but obviously she has some ideas in mind if she's making such a bold statement. It will be very interesting to see how this week plays out and if we get some real tangible progress moving.
This comes from a news story at CTV.ca. I must say that I'm very surprised to hear her saying this only a matter of hours after trying to get all parties scheduled to attend the Middle East peace talks held in the US this week to go in with somewhat low expectations. I guess we can safely that they've been raised extraordinarily high now.
I am in favour of the two-state solution. I would love to see the day that it takes place. I don't know what parameters Rice intends to put forward regarding the continguousness of such a state, its borders, its security situation, or any of the other hindrances to achieving this objective, but obviously she has some ideas in mind if she's making such a bold statement. It will be very interesting to see how this week plays out and if we get some real tangible progress moving.
14 October 2007
Osirak Redux?
There have been revelations this morning about the Israeli air strike against a Syrian facility last month. It turns out that the building was a nascent nuclear facility that could have ultimately been used to develop weapons-grade plutonium. Indeed, the model for the facility appears to be based on that used by North Korea to develop its nuclear weapons stockpile.
Because this was a preemptive strike against a facility very early in its development, it is very difficult to assess what it would have been used for. This is the great problem of preemption: it is impossible to fully ascertain what would have happened in the absence of the preemptive action, and the consequences of the action could prove more dangerous than what would have happened otherwise. Israel's strike against Iraq's Osirak facility in 1981 is a striking parallel. Initially condemned by the U.S. under the Reagan Administration, the strike has now been regarded as a very successful example of preemption because it set back Saddam Hussein's ability to develop a nuclear weapon by several years. The facility was years away from being completed, so it would have been probably close to a decade before it could have churned out weapons-grade nuclear material. Whether this inspires Syria to launch a renewed crash program or to abandon the pursuit of nuclear technology out of fear of further reprisal remains to be seen, and Assad's course of action will go a long way in determining whether the Israeli attack was justified.
Syria's near-silence on the matter suggests that there may be an element of "Gotcha!" involved, as one would expect there to be a torrent of outrage stemming from the country after an Israeli incursion into Syrian territory to attack one of its installations. There hasn't been any staging of propaganda events, "death to Israel" marches, or wide-ranging proclamations from any of the other countries in the region. Now, Syria may not be the most well-liked Middle East dictatorial regime, but there is generally a strong camaraderie when it comes to Israel and any cross-border action it may undertake. Damasacus has been on Washington's bad list for a long time, though, and that may be inspiring the region's more pragmatic leaders to keep Assad at arm's length and not do much of anything to strengthen his hand. A lot of people were quietly urging back in 2003 for the Bush Administration to send a couple of battalions on a little detour to topple Assad while the invasion of Iraq was ongoing, and I distinctly recall one of my old professors musing that Assad had to be "shitting his pants" at the prospect of the Iraq war. So perhaps that helps to explain why Syria and its assumed friends haven't been making too much of a stink about the Israeli strike.
This is going to be a situation worth monitoring in the coming weeks. There may or may not be more information coming out, as the intelligence communities have been very tight-lipped about the particulars of the strike, but if they do decide to let news out, it will hopefully clarify the picture a little and remove some of the murky details. If it can be demonstrably proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the Syrian facility was to be used for illicit nuclear activities, this will be a blow in favour of nuclear non-proliferation and a check on the ledger for preemption. Only time will tell.
Because this was a preemptive strike against a facility very early in its development, it is very difficult to assess what it would have been used for. This is the great problem of preemption: it is impossible to fully ascertain what would have happened in the absence of the preemptive action, and the consequences of the action could prove more dangerous than what would have happened otherwise. Israel's strike against Iraq's Osirak facility in 1981 is a striking parallel. Initially condemned by the U.S. under the Reagan Administration, the strike has now been regarded as a very successful example of preemption because it set back Saddam Hussein's ability to develop a nuclear weapon by several years. The facility was years away from being completed, so it would have been probably close to a decade before it could have churned out weapons-grade nuclear material. Whether this inspires Syria to launch a renewed crash program or to abandon the pursuit of nuclear technology out of fear of further reprisal remains to be seen, and Assad's course of action will go a long way in determining whether the Israeli attack was justified.
Syria's near-silence on the matter suggests that there may be an element of "Gotcha!" involved, as one would expect there to be a torrent of outrage stemming from the country after an Israeli incursion into Syrian territory to attack one of its installations. There hasn't been any staging of propaganda events, "death to Israel" marches, or wide-ranging proclamations from any of the other countries in the region. Now, Syria may not be the most well-liked Middle East dictatorial regime, but there is generally a strong camaraderie when it comes to Israel and any cross-border action it may undertake. Damasacus has been on Washington's bad list for a long time, though, and that may be inspiring the region's more pragmatic leaders to keep Assad at arm's length and not do much of anything to strengthen his hand. A lot of people were quietly urging back in 2003 for the Bush Administration to send a couple of battalions on a little detour to topple Assad while the invasion of Iraq was ongoing, and I distinctly recall one of my old professors musing that Assad had to be "shitting his pants" at the prospect of the Iraq war. So perhaps that helps to explain why Syria and its assumed friends haven't been making too much of a stink about the Israeli strike.
This is going to be a situation worth monitoring in the coming weeks. There may or may not be more information coming out, as the intelligence communities have been very tight-lipped about the particulars of the strike, but if they do decide to let news out, it will hopefully clarify the picture a little and remove some of the murky details. If it can be demonstrably proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the Syrian facility was to be used for illicit nuclear activities, this will be a blow in favour of nuclear non-proliferation and a check on the ledger for preemption. Only time will tell.
25 June 2007
In The Headlines
There is no shortage of big-ticket news items today:
There is a major meeting happening in Egypt today involving the Palestinian Authority, Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. This is the first diplomatic initiative to occur since the election of Hamas last year. With Abbas flailing after losing control over Gaza, it is important that he be seen to be effective and still the real leader and champion of the aspirations of the Palestinian people. As always, skepticism and severely guarded optimism is the best approach, but that these parties are all talking again is a first step.
Tomorrow is Tony Blair's final day as the Prime Minister of Britain. America's best ally in the War on Terror and Tyranny is stepping down, and already rumours are circulating as to where he goes from here. The G&M has a story about Blair possibly being named a peace envoy to the Middle East for the Quartet. This is a position that many have said previously would be the perfect fit for Bill Clinton, but Blair would also be tremendous in the role. He's an expert diplomat, calm and reassuring yet tough and principled, and would have the full support of the West. Here's hoping that it turns out to be true, because this is a leader that should remain connected to major processes.
Also, this is an example of why I like the Government of Canada more than its elected representatives. This analysis of the 2006 US National Security Strategy is one of the best that I've seen--and I've seen many...and even written one. There's a lot in this document that is pretty similar in its conclusions to what I wrote about in my thesis. It focuses, naturally, more on the implications of the NSS for Canada than I did (since I was writing from an IR perspective and not a Government of Canada perspective), and I was pleased to read that it concludes that there are "many positive signs" for Canada in the new overarching US grand strategic policy blueprint.
There is a major meeting happening in Egypt today involving the Palestinian Authority, Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. This is the first diplomatic initiative to occur since the election of Hamas last year. With Abbas flailing after losing control over Gaza, it is important that he be seen to be effective and still the real leader and champion of the aspirations of the Palestinian people. As always, skepticism and severely guarded optimism is the best approach, but that these parties are all talking again is a first step.
Tomorrow is Tony Blair's final day as the Prime Minister of Britain. America's best ally in the War on Terror and Tyranny is stepping down, and already rumours are circulating as to where he goes from here. The G&M has a story about Blair possibly being named a peace envoy to the Middle East for the Quartet. This is a position that many have said previously would be the perfect fit for Bill Clinton, but Blair would also be tremendous in the role. He's an expert diplomat, calm and reassuring yet tough and principled, and would have the full support of the West. Here's hoping that it turns out to be true, because this is a leader that should remain connected to major processes.
Also, this is an example of why I like the Government of Canada more than its elected representatives. This analysis of the 2006 US National Security Strategy is one of the best that I've seen--and I've seen many...and even written one. There's a lot in this document that is pretty similar in its conclusions to what I wrote about in my thesis. It focuses, naturally, more on the implications of the NSS for Canada than I did (since I was writing from an IR perspective and not a Government of Canada perspective), and I was pleased to read that it concludes that there are "many positive signs" for Canada in the new overarching US grand strategic policy blueprint.
21 June 2007
Irwin Cotler on Israel & the UN
Today, former Minister of Justice Irwin Cotler has a fantastic editorial in the online edition of the Globe and Mail. Read it here. Cotler's article points out how criticizing and condemning only Israel's policies in the UN Human Rights Council is anti-Semitic in its tone and substance. I've been in a couple heated discussions involving Israel lately, and in both cases the topic of criticism of Israel's policies and anti-Semitism has come up. One can disagree and be critical of specific Israeli policies without being anti-Semitic; rational people simply call that a discussion or a debate. But what Cotler is discussing goes much deeper:
Regrettably, this discriminatory and one-sided approach has become not the exception but the norm. Council sessions of the past year reflected not only the same contempt for the rule of law, but the systematic singling-out of a member state for selective and discriminatory treatment, while granting the major violators exculpatory immunity.
Examples abound:
– There have been nine resolutions condemning one member state only (Israel) but none of any of the other 191 members of the international community, including, for example, no condemnation of the genocide in Darfur, or of the public and direct incitement to genocide and massive human-rights violations in President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's Iran.
– The continuing exclusion of one member state (Israel) from membership in any of the five regional groups that govern the council, thereby denying a member state the fundamental rights of due process and equitable standing.
– The council's discourse, as exemplified in the session just ended, as an endless drumbeat of indictment and incitement against Israel, again contrary to the council's founding principles and procedures.
Way, way back when the new Council was first established I expressed my severe doubts about the legitimacy and sustainability of the new body. I hate to be proven right when it comes to such a serious topic as human rights. The UN has long been institutionalizing hatred of Israel, and many individual people read these UN reports without any counterbalancing literature and end up contributing to the problem that has turned the state of Israel into "the Jew among nations," which is in itself a contemptuous anti-Semitic term. The Human Rights Council is the latest UN arm in extending anti-Israel and anti-Semitic sentiment.
When someone as distinguished as Professor Cotler expresses his frustration at the UN in such strong terms, something is deeply wrong. For those who don't know, Cotler has been around in Canadian politics for a very long time and played no small role in promoting the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms when it was initially conceived. He represented Natan Sharansky when he was on trial in the Soviet Union (Sharansky, after being released, returned to Israel and has been a very successful politician; he also wrote me a nice email after I emailed him about his book The Case for Democracy) and his rights were being abused. He's a long-time friend of Alan Dershowitz, who knows a thing or two about rights. But he is most well-known to me for the simple statement: "rights are rights are rights."
Regrettably, this discriminatory and one-sided approach has become not the exception but the norm. Council sessions of the past year reflected not only the same contempt for the rule of law, but the systematic singling-out of a member state for selective and discriminatory treatment, while granting the major violators exculpatory immunity.
Examples abound:
– There have been nine resolutions condemning one member state only (Israel) but none of any of the other 191 members of the international community, including, for example, no condemnation of the genocide in Darfur, or of the public and direct incitement to genocide and massive human-rights violations in President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's Iran.
– The continuing exclusion of one member state (Israel) from membership in any of the five regional groups that govern the council, thereby denying a member state the fundamental rights of due process and equitable standing.
– The council's discourse, as exemplified in the session just ended, as an endless drumbeat of indictment and incitement against Israel, again contrary to the council's founding principles and procedures.
Way, way back when the new Council was first established I expressed my severe doubts about the legitimacy and sustainability of the new body. I hate to be proven right when it comes to such a serious topic as human rights. The UN has long been institutionalizing hatred of Israel, and many individual people read these UN reports without any counterbalancing literature and end up contributing to the problem that has turned the state of Israel into "the Jew among nations," which is in itself a contemptuous anti-Semitic term. The Human Rights Council is the latest UN arm in extending anti-Israel and anti-Semitic sentiment.
When someone as distinguished as Professor Cotler expresses his frustration at the UN in such strong terms, something is deeply wrong. For those who don't know, Cotler has been around in Canadian politics for a very long time and played no small role in promoting the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms when it was initially conceived. He represented Natan Sharansky when he was on trial in the Soviet Union (Sharansky, after being released, returned to Israel and has been a very successful politician; he also wrote me a nice email after I emailed him about his book The Case for Democracy) and his rights were being abused. He's a long-time friend of Alan Dershowitz, who knows a thing or two about rights. But he is most well-known to me for the simple statement: "rights are rights are rights."
17 June 2007
A "Two-Palestines" Policy?
The events of the past week in the Gaza Strip have potential to shake diplomacy and statecraft in the Middle East for months and years to come. With the de facto establishment of Hamas-stan in Gaza, the West is quickly turning its attention and support to Mahmoud Abbas' moderate government based out of the West Bank. Today we learned that Canada is going to resume its aid to the Palestinian Authority, and presumably other countries are going to follow suit in an attempt to bolster his Fatah party as the best potential partner for peace and the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. This is sensible, as moving forward is in just about everybody's interest, but it also an approach that may lead to future difficulties.
In the short term, it will appear as though the West is abandoning the Palestinians in the West Bank who want no part of a Hamas-led territory. We have already seen large numbers of people flocking to the border with Israel in an attempt to get out of Gaza and into either Israel or the West Bank. Those people who are not as fortunate or do not have the means to get out of the Strip will be trapped in what can only be described as a hellhole. There will be no direct international aid flowing to a terrorist organization because we know that Hamas will not use the moneys for advancing the interests of the people in Gaza; rather, they will use it to purchase arms and disseminate anti-West/anti-Israel propaganda. Meanwhile, they will utilize the images of Palestinians in the West Bank living comfortably and blame the suffering of Palestinians trapped in Gaza on Israel, the occupation, and anybody else that they believe they can credibly pass the buck to.
Additionally, a territory dominated by Hamas will become a mini-Afghanistan circa the late 1990's. They will use the land to train people for jihad against Israel, instructing them how to use illegally-purchased assault weapons, devise IEDs, and inflict damage against civilian populations. With the war against Hezbollah fresh in everybody's minds, Israel will no doubt be compelled to fortify itself against a likely attack emanating out of Hamas-controlled Gaza. This will only allow Hamas further propaganda opportunities to incite violence against Israel.
With aid restored to Abbas, he will be able to strengthen security in the West Bank, crack down on insurgents and terrorists, and demonstrate that there has been progress and possibly seek new discussions about a Palestinian state in the West Bank. There will be considerable support for this initiative should he be able to consistently demonstrate progress in the West Bank along well-established political and security metrics. I'm looking at a timeframe of months here; if the West Bank consolidates while Gaza continues to deteriorate, by the end of the year there will be two very different sections of land that have long been considered the foundation points for a future Palestinian state. It is doubtful, of course, that the Palestinians will only accept a state that is only half of what has been the consensus view for the past decade, but if Gaza becomes a lost hope, will Abbas cut his losses and accept the best deal he can?
This is a very fluid situation, though clearly things are not looking good for the future status of the Palestinians of the Gaza Strip. Unless the tide turns, we may well be looking at a two-track policy vis-a-vis Palestine. And that could have very serious and grave consequences for the future.
In the short term, it will appear as though the West is abandoning the Palestinians in the West Bank who want no part of a Hamas-led territory. We have already seen large numbers of people flocking to the border with Israel in an attempt to get out of Gaza and into either Israel or the West Bank. Those people who are not as fortunate or do not have the means to get out of the Strip will be trapped in what can only be described as a hellhole. There will be no direct international aid flowing to a terrorist organization because we know that Hamas will not use the moneys for advancing the interests of the people in Gaza; rather, they will use it to purchase arms and disseminate anti-West/anti-Israel propaganda. Meanwhile, they will utilize the images of Palestinians in the West Bank living comfortably and blame the suffering of Palestinians trapped in Gaza on Israel, the occupation, and anybody else that they believe they can credibly pass the buck to.
Additionally, a territory dominated by Hamas will become a mini-Afghanistan circa the late 1990's. They will use the land to train people for jihad against Israel, instructing them how to use illegally-purchased assault weapons, devise IEDs, and inflict damage against civilian populations. With the war against Hezbollah fresh in everybody's minds, Israel will no doubt be compelled to fortify itself against a likely attack emanating out of Hamas-controlled Gaza. This will only allow Hamas further propaganda opportunities to incite violence against Israel.
With aid restored to Abbas, he will be able to strengthen security in the West Bank, crack down on insurgents and terrorists, and demonstrate that there has been progress and possibly seek new discussions about a Palestinian state in the West Bank. There will be considerable support for this initiative should he be able to consistently demonstrate progress in the West Bank along well-established political and security metrics. I'm looking at a timeframe of months here; if the West Bank consolidates while Gaza continues to deteriorate, by the end of the year there will be two very different sections of land that have long been considered the foundation points for a future Palestinian state. It is doubtful, of course, that the Palestinians will only accept a state that is only half of what has been the consensus view for the past decade, but if Gaza becomes a lost hope, will Abbas cut his losses and accept the best deal he can?
This is a very fluid situation, though clearly things are not looking good for the future status of the Palestinians of the Gaza Strip. Unless the tide turns, we may well be looking at a two-track policy vis-a-vis Palestine. And that could have very serious and grave consequences for the future.
31 May 2007
On Pro's and Anti's in the Israel-Palestine Conflict
Today I received an email from the Canada-Israel Committee informing me of the latest anti-Israel action undertaken by the academic community, a boycott of all Israeli academic institutions by the Union of College and Universities in the UK. There have been a number of such condemnations of Israel by academics, and no such recriminations against the Palestinians. If there were balanced, fair, and proper denunciations of particular policies or actions by both sides, the claim of anti-Israel or anti-Semitic bias would lose considerable legitimacy. But that balance does not truly exist. It is overwhelmingly Israel that is denounced, in blanket terms, such as these boycotts, and the Palestinian extremists such as Hamas, often see their deliberate crimes against Israeli citizens receive no condemnation or criticism at all from the academic community. I don't know whether it is because these academics hold Israel to a higher standard because they believe Israel should be held to a higher standard--which amounts to racism against Palestinians--or because they are simply repulsed by everything that Israel does vis-a-vis the Palestinians, which is simply anti-Semitism.
I've often found that there is almost a de facto position of being pro-Palestine built in to being pro-Israel, unless one is on the extreme fringe and believes in the "Greater Israel" concept that outright excludes conceding any territory to the Palestinians. Maybe it's just me, but my pro-Israel stance includes the two-state solution, the continued stringent application of the rule of law by Israel's judiciary to prevent and punish excessive military actions against Palestinians where civilians are put at risk, and looking forward to the day when the security fence is no longer necessary and divisive of two neighbours who live side-by-side in peace and prosperity.
It is unfortunate that, for some people, being pro-Palestine includes a default position of being anti-Israel. Whether referring insidiously to the "occupation," the "apartheid wall," or "Zionist oppression," these people are blinded by their desire to see peace without accountability and responsibility being established by the Palestinian leadership. They want Israel to immediately unilaterally concede all territories that Israel occupied, not merely "territories" in the wake of comprehensive negotiations with a Palestinian leadership that has gained internal and external legitimacy, reined in terrorists and rejectionists, and is ready to move forward towards a lasting and just settlement. For those people, humiliating Israel appears to trump all other rational considerations, including even the truth, as this quote from a letter written in yesterday's Chronicle-Herald, exemplifies:
I've often found that there is almost a de facto position of being pro-Palestine built in to being pro-Israel, unless one is on the extreme fringe and believes in the "Greater Israel" concept that outright excludes conceding any territory to the Palestinians. Maybe it's just me, but my pro-Israel stance includes the two-state solution, the continued stringent application of the rule of law by Israel's judiciary to prevent and punish excessive military actions against Palestinians where civilians are put at risk, and looking forward to the day when the security fence is no longer necessary and divisive of two neighbours who live side-by-side in peace and prosperity.
It is unfortunate that, for some people, being pro-Palestine includes a default position of being anti-Israel. Whether referring insidiously to the "occupation," the "apartheid wall," or "Zionist oppression," these people are blinded by their desire to see peace without accountability and responsibility being established by the Palestinian leadership. They want Israel to immediately unilaterally concede all territories that Israel occupied, not merely "territories" in the wake of comprehensive negotiations with a Palestinian leadership that has gained internal and external legitimacy, reined in terrorists and rejectionists, and is ready to move forward towards a lasting and just settlement. For those people, humiliating Israel appears to trump all other rational considerations, including even the truth, as this quote from a letter written in yesterday's Chronicle-Herald, exemplifies:
The Israeli practices in the Occupied Palestinian Territories stand in violation of virtually every article of the Fourth Geneva Convention, and include extra-judicial assassination, torture, daily humiliation, denial of health care, demolition of thousands of homes and expropriation of property for the creation of illegal Jewish settlements.
Reality is far different from what this letter-writer states. The claims are so absurd that one could very easily go out and provide any number of links that utterly rebuke this pack of filthy lies. However, it is this type of deliberate misinformation that is relied upon by the pro-Palestine/anti-Israel crowd, and it is deeply insidious and harmful to any peace process. How can one expect to be part of the solution when they make such statements that serve only to incite hatred of Israel and falsely-based sympathy for the Palestinians? They simply cannot. Both sides have to make concessions that will be painful, yet to this point, only Israel has demonstrated that it is willing to do that in the name of peace.
27 April 2007
Latest Book
Building on my Dershowitz collection, I'm currently reading his 2005 work, The Case for Peace. The book was written after the death of the greatest barrier to peace in the Arab-Israeli dispute--Yasser Arafat--so it has a sense of renewed optimism that peace via the two-state solution can finally be achieved. I'm only in the early going so far, but I recognize many of the key themes that also appeared in The Case for Israel. This is not entirely surprising, as I've come to notice that what is in the best interest of the Jewish state coincides with what is best for a stable, lasting peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians.
This subject is one area that I feel I've come to understand much better in the past year or two. I feel comfortable engaging in debates on it (which I did yesterday over at Cherniak's, though a rebuttal post to a commenter advocating a one-state solution was apparently lost to the Blogger gremlins), and I have more confidence that the points I seek to make are valid and well-founded. It is a very controversial topic for some people, and one of perpetual frustration for others. But it is an important issue that needs to be resolved because far too many lives have been lost needlessly when the alternatives to peace appeared to be more in the interests of some parties than to others. It is criminal that the dispute wasn't resolved in 2000, and every life lost is a consequence of Arafat's decision to not make peace.
With him gone, and a more moderate Palestinian government in place--Hamas' participation notwithstanding--there should be a renewed push to achieve peace and the two-state solution. The road-map that was introduced in 2003 needs to be picked up again, and both sides will have to make painful concessions in their negotiations in order to fulfill its objectives, but getting half a loaf and peace is much better than seeking more than half a loaf and getting only more conflict.
This subject is one area that I feel I've come to understand much better in the past year or two. I feel comfortable engaging in debates on it (which I did yesterday over at Cherniak's, though a rebuttal post to a commenter advocating a one-state solution was apparently lost to the Blogger gremlins), and I have more confidence that the points I seek to make are valid and well-founded. It is a very controversial topic for some people, and one of perpetual frustration for others. But it is an important issue that needs to be resolved because far too many lives have been lost needlessly when the alternatives to peace appeared to be more in the interests of some parties than to others. It is criminal that the dispute wasn't resolved in 2000, and every life lost is a consequence of Arafat's decision to not make peace.
With him gone, and a more moderate Palestinian government in place--Hamas' participation notwithstanding--there should be a renewed push to achieve peace and the two-state solution. The road-map that was introduced in 2003 needs to be picked up again, and both sides will have to make painful concessions in their negotiations in order to fulfill its objectives, but getting half a loaf and peace is much better than seeking more than half a loaf and getting only more conflict.
25 April 2007
The Defeated Resolution
I've been mulling over whether to do a full post on the now-defeated Coderre resolution that would have purportedly brought an end to Canada's combat mission in Afghanistan in February 2009. After looking at it more closely, I've decided to go ahead on the grounds that the Liberals, for all their claims of seeking "clarity" on Canada's commitment to Afghanistan's reconstruction, would have further muddied the waters. First, the resolution's active clause (for the preambulatory clauses, go here:
this House call upon the government to confirm that Canada’s existing military deployment in Afghanistan will continue until February 2009, at which time Canadian combat operations in Southern Afghanistan will conclude; and call upon the government to notify NATO of this decision immediately.
I am not a linguist by trade, nor am I a lawyer. Nonetheless, I know that the wording of this resolution is deeply flawed if the Liberals truly want to bring an end to all Canadian combat missions in Afghanistan at the current February 2009 deadline. I don't know whether they purposefully or unintentionally left the clause vague, but nonetheless this resolution left open the door for the government to continue military operations beyond February 2009. Allow me to explain.
First, the resolution speaks of the "existing military deployment," which can be interpreted to mean the current operation and not the mission itself. Suppose Canada order a fresh military deployment to another region of Afghanistan, either by sending in new forces or a re-deployment of current Canadian Forces already in Afghanistan. How would such a new deployment relate to this resolution? What if the government were to order a new deployment scheduled to begin in March 2009? These are important questions that the failed Liberal measure does not address.
Second, the resolution calls for "Canadian combat operations" in "Southern Afghanistan" to conclude. It doesn't call for an end to "all Canadian combat operations in Afghanistan" in February 2009. This can allow for the Canadian Forces to deployed in Afghanistan for designated non-combat operations, and it can also allow for them to be re-deployed to another region of Afghanistan for combat operations. Most importantly of all, it doesn't call for all Canadian combat operations to end. The addition of the word "the" before "Canadian combat operations" would make it more restrictive, but worded as it is, it is still left vague and open to interpretation.
This brings to mind something which I read in Alan Dershowitz's book, The Case for Israel. In it, Dershowitz examines the language of UN Security Council Resolution 242, which calls for the return of "territories" to a future state called Palestine. It does not call for "all territories" or "the territories" that have been occupied by Israel, though that is the position which most hardliners and the terrorist organizations have claimed to be mandated by the UN. Under that language, Israel will be obligated, and is readily prepared, to concede some territory that will form the nucleus of a Palestinian state. But it is not obligated to return all of the territory.
The Liberal resolution relies upon similar wording, so it is entirely reasonable to interpret it in a similar fashion. By calling for "Canadian combat operations" to end, the resolution does not call for a withdrawal of all Canadian Forces from Kandahar nor does it call for the end of all combat operations in "Southern Afghanistan." Thus, Jack Layton had a point when he said that the resolution opens the door for extending the mission, a point which the Liberals' star blogger has missed, which is something totally anathema to the NDP's desire for immediate withdrawal of all Canadian Forces personnel from combat operations in Afghanistan.
The Liberals' failed resolution did not bring clarity. I am astonished that their leader, who prides himself and refers to the Clarity Act (1998) as a highlight of his career, allowed the resolution to go as far as it did. Had it been passed, it would have done the opposite of providing clarity to Canada's mission in Afghanistan. The serious unresolved questions that I raised above, combined with the horribly bad wording, would have left the status of Canada's Afghanistan mission with even less clarity, and subject to the interpretation of the governing party.
this House call upon the government to confirm that Canada’s existing military deployment in Afghanistan will continue until February 2009, at which time Canadian combat operations in Southern Afghanistan will conclude; and call upon the government to notify NATO of this decision immediately.
I am not a linguist by trade, nor am I a lawyer. Nonetheless, I know that the wording of this resolution is deeply flawed if the Liberals truly want to bring an end to all Canadian combat missions in Afghanistan at the current February 2009 deadline. I don't know whether they purposefully or unintentionally left the clause vague, but nonetheless this resolution left open the door for the government to continue military operations beyond February 2009. Allow me to explain.
First, the resolution speaks of the "existing military deployment," which can be interpreted to mean the current operation and not the mission itself. Suppose Canada order a fresh military deployment to another region of Afghanistan, either by sending in new forces or a re-deployment of current Canadian Forces already in Afghanistan. How would such a new deployment relate to this resolution? What if the government were to order a new deployment scheduled to begin in March 2009? These are important questions that the failed Liberal measure does not address.
Second, the resolution calls for "Canadian combat operations" in "Southern Afghanistan" to conclude. It doesn't call for an end to "all Canadian combat operations in Afghanistan" in February 2009. This can allow for the Canadian Forces to deployed in Afghanistan for designated non-combat operations, and it can also allow for them to be re-deployed to another region of Afghanistan for combat operations. Most importantly of all, it doesn't call for all Canadian combat operations to end. The addition of the word "the" before "Canadian combat operations" would make it more restrictive, but worded as it is, it is still left vague and open to interpretation.
This brings to mind something which I read in Alan Dershowitz's book, The Case for Israel. In it, Dershowitz examines the language of UN Security Council Resolution 242, which calls for the return of "territories" to a future state called Palestine. It does not call for "all territories" or "the territories" that have been occupied by Israel, though that is the position which most hardliners and the terrorist organizations have claimed to be mandated by the UN. Under that language, Israel will be obligated, and is readily prepared, to concede some territory that will form the nucleus of a Palestinian state. But it is not obligated to return all of the territory.
The Liberal resolution relies upon similar wording, so it is entirely reasonable to interpret it in a similar fashion. By calling for "Canadian combat operations" to end, the resolution does not call for a withdrawal of all Canadian Forces from Kandahar nor does it call for the end of all combat operations in "Southern Afghanistan." Thus, Jack Layton had a point when he said that the resolution opens the door for extending the mission, a point which the Liberals' star blogger has missed, which is something totally anathema to the NDP's desire for immediate withdrawal of all Canadian Forces personnel from combat operations in Afghanistan.
The Liberals' failed resolution did not bring clarity. I am astonished that their leader, who prides himself and refers to the Clarity Act (1998) as a highlight of his career, allowed the resolution to go as far as it did. Had it been passed, it would have done the opposite of providing clarity to Canada's mission in Afghanistan. The serious unresolved questions that I raised above, combined with the horribly bad wording, would have left the status of Canada's Afghanistan mission with even less clarity, and subject to the interpretation of the governing party.
Win Some, Lose Some
Mixed news coming from the fronts of the War on Terror...
Canadian MPs voted down the Liberals' bill to unilaterally withdraw from Afghanistan in February 2009. I can't really congratulate the NDP for having courage to stand up for Canadian national interests given their real motivation, but at least they didn't side with the Liberals in order to get a foot in the door when it comes to a timetable. I'd imagine that once they'd gotten that, they would slowly chip away at the withdrawal date.
To nobody's surprise, Hamas is lobbing rockets into Israel again. After the multi-front conflict that also involved Iran's proxy Hezbollah, many of us knew we would be at this place again within a matter of months. Here we are. Israel is presently meeting to decide what to do in response to this latest challenge and provocation from terrorists. Whatever they decide to do, so long as it falls within the boundaries of acceptable policy (which is very likely the case), Canada should fully support its democratic ally.
Canadian MPs voted down the Liberals' bill to unilaterally withdraw from Afghanistan in February 2009. I can't really congratulate the NDP for having courage to stand up for Canadian national interests given their real motivation, but at least they didn't side with the Liberals in order to get a foot in the door when it comes to a timetable. I'd imagine that once they'd gotten that, they would slowly chip away at the withdrawal date.
To nobody's surprise, Hamas is lobbing rockets into Israel again. After the multi-front conflict that also involved Iran's proxy Hezbollah, many of us knew we would be at this place again within a matter of months. Here we are. Israel is presently meeting to decide what to do in response to this latest challenge and provocation from terrorists. Whatever they decide to do, so long as it falls within the boundaries of acceptable policy (which is very likely the case), Canada should fully support its democratic ally.
06 April 2007
Lessons from the Israel-Hezbollah Conflict
Anybody with more than a passing interest in international relations and the ongoing struggle between democratic states and terrorist networks--quite possibly the defining feature of 21st century IR--should read this article by Sarah Kreps in the latest issue of Parameters. Entitled "The 2006 Lebanon War: Lessons Learned," Kreps touches on many of the key themes to emerge from the conflict, including, but not limited to: the asymmetry of a democratic state in a conflict against a terrorist organization, the shortcomings of airpower in modern warfare, the influence (and manipulation) of the media to shape perceptions, Qana, and the still-unresolved fate of Corporal Gilad Shalit and the other abducted Israeli soldier whose illegal capture served as the casus belli for last summer's conflict.
Kreps' article is very engaging, and I'd recommend it to anybody that is trying to get a handle on the inherent differences between democracies and terrorists in this war. The suggestion of treating both sides even-handedly or with a balanced approach is ludicrous, and that is something else which comes clear in this reading.
Kreps' article is very engaging, and I'd recommend it to anybody that is trying to get a handle on the inherent differences between democracies and terrorists in this war. The suggestion of treating both sides even-handedly or with a balanced approach is ludicrous, and that is something else which comes clear in this reading.
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